A Guide to Implementing the Theory of
Constraints (TOC) |
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Introduction Logic does matter, it matters a great deal. And perhaps the most important logic that impacts
upon us is the fundamental conflict or generic “cloud” that underlies
healthcare. If we don’t understand
this then we simply can’t move forward.
A cloud might sound like a funny name but that is what it is called
and that is the terminology that we will use here. You will soon get use to it. I wrote this
cloud after asking someone to explain to me what the fundamental or generic
cloud in public service healthcare is.
I had an open mind and was interested to see what the response was –
and I wasn’t going to do it for them.
However, the response wasn’t forthcoming and one popped into my head
and that is where it stayed until this page. There is no
point in “telling” the cloud to you, and there is nothing better than working
through a cloud together, so lets do that, right now. We are going
to follow the procedure in the PowerPoints called Logical Types, Clouds, &
Fantasies and the Reformulated Lieutenant’s Cloud. The rules for constructing
systemic clouds are in these presentations and you can use the same approach
for any systemic problem. There will also
be abundant “symptomatic” clouds that will fall out of this systemic cloud
that might better detail your own exact local problem. However, don’t lose sight of this generic
cloud, it will be there, either “lying” below or “sitting” on top, or maybe
“floating” above your own local description. A cloud is a
graphical representation of an underlying conflict or compromise. It consists of 5 elements – boxes actually. Let’s have a
look at these. The first element is an objective, the outcome that we seek. It is fed by two concomitant needs. The needs are in-turn fed by two “wants”
and it is here that life gets interesting.
The wants are mutually exclusive.
We can have one or the other but not both; well certainly not both at
the same time. The wants are in
conflict with one another. We indicate
this with the lightening-bolt-like set of arrows. It might be
more appropriate to address the “wants” as follows; If we label one as a “don’t want” and another as “do want” then the
conflict is more apparent. The
negative or “don’t want,” by convention, is located in the upper position and
the positive or “do want,” by convention, is located in the lower position. Another way of
wording these elements is as follows; The needs can be viewed as requirements in order to meet the
objective. The wants, in-turn, can be
viewed as pre-requisites in order to meet the requirements. Of course the pre-requisites are still in
conflict regardless of how we address them. Now there is a
small amount of short-hand which sometimes helps us in using and
communicating clouds and we should incorporate this as well. We simply label the elements as A, B, C, D,
and D’ (read as “D prime”). Let’s have a
look at this and let’s also revert to using “needs” and “wants” as the
descriptions. Let’s now fill in the specifics for public service healthcare – in
particular non-acute or “elective” services – although the basic cloud covers
other aspects as well (emergency department and nursing for example). We need to
work around this cloud filling in the details. We are going to do this in a very specific
sequence; clockwise from D then D’ then C then A and finally B. There are good reasons for doing this. So we need to first
ask ourselves what is it about healthcare at the moment that overall we don’t
want? What is it that encapsulates all
the stuff that we have to put up with in the current reality, indeed that we
are often forced to put up with, that we do not
like and that we do not want? If we invoke
the wisdom of an 8 year-old, then we can also test our current reality
against Quincy’s Rule (1); what is it in D that is the answer to all of our
sad questions? For me,
restricted access is the overarching description that best fills this
entity. Sure, you may find other ways
to express this same concept – lack of access, limited access, and so forth. Let’s put this
in and see. How many of the current things that we have and that we do not want in
public healthcare could be covered by this generalized entity? Or that we can trace back to this entity? Probably almost all of them. The next
entity, D’ is easier. It has to be
mutually exclusive, that normally means that it has to be the opposite. It also has to be something positive that
we do want in the near future. It also
has to be the answer to all the glad questions according to Quincy’s Rule. Let’s keep it
simple and put “full access” as the description that best fills the D’
entity. Let’s add
this. Let’s run a check. Can we have
both restricted access and full access at the same time? Are they in conflict with one another? They would certainly seem to be so. Moreover, if we could have full access
would many, or most, or in fact all, of the current problems go away? That would, indeed, seem likely. So now we must
ask what need in C is met by the want in D’ of full access. I think that if we had full access then we
could ensure appropriate treatment.
And that is the description that I am going to put into C. Let’s have a
look. Let’s read C and D’ back and see if they make sense. We will use the formula “In order to have C
it is necessary that we have D’.”
Let’s read this through and see if it works. In order
to ensure appropriate treatment it is necessary
that we have full access. That seems to
make sense to me. Or we could
test it using “we must have” rather than “it is necessary that we have.” Let’s try that as well. In
order to ensure appropriate treatment we must have
full access. That also
seems to work. In fact doing
this normally flushes a few unstated assumptions out as well. The assumptions are viewed as “sitting”
under the C-D’ arrow. They are
additional sufficiency in what is otherwise a bare-bones necessity-based
logic. Let’s work through the
verbalization first and then draw it. We will just
tack on a “because” to the end of our last sentence; “in order to ensure
appropriate treatment we must have full access because ... ?” What shall we
put in there? Well, I will put because
the treatment is timely. I have no
doubt that the clinical professionals will make sure the treatment is
appropriate, but the sooner that it is done, the less invasive or disruptive
or expensive it is likely to be. Let’s
draw this. Now just a note, full access doesn’t mean trivial access, it means
access within agreed clinical guidelines.
The public health service is not everything to everybody. There are some procedures that might be
regarded as unnecessary or discretionary or cosmetic and are therefore better
placed in the private sector. Also
some referrals from general practice to specialists, as an example, may go no
further than just a referral – they fail to meet the protocols of the specialist
for further treatment. But access, and
full access at that, to the necessary expertise for such a decision is often
lacking or missing at the moment. In fact we
have just uncovered a jeopardy arrow.
Let’s have a look. Ensuring appropriate treatment is a vision of the future, it is not
here yet, and in fact its very existence is jeopardized by the current
restricted access that we are forced to put up with. C is jeopardized by D. That is; ensuring appropriate treatment is
jeopardized by restricted access. It is not a
pretty sight, but let’s keep moving on.
Let’s look at the objective in A. What is the
objective that we are seeking to meet?
I think that it is quite simple, I think that it should be something
as simple as “good healthcare.” Let’s have a
look. Does that seem like a worthy objective? It is certainly positive. It seems to
make sense, so let’s run our tests and check this out. In
order to have good healthcare it is necessary
that we ensure appropriate treatment. That seems
fine, lets check the other wording. In
order to have good healthcare we must ensure
appropriate treatment. That also
seems fine. Moreover,
these verbalizations are starting to chase out assumptions “under” the A-B
arrow. Let’s have a look. It is necessary to ensure appropriate treatment because often
intervention is the only recourse.
Wouldn’t it be great if primary, proactive and preventative healthcare
methods worked more fully – they have tremendous potential, and wouldn’t it
be great if people would more actively take them up. However, many conditions are still beyond
our current control and secondary reactive intervention is the only recourse
available to us in order to ensure good healthcare. This is the major assumption here. Now, this just
leaves us with just one more entity, the need in B. The rationale for leaving this until last
is that, arguably, it is the most important.
It is something that exists within our current reality that is
positive in its own right – we wouldn’t knowingly set out to do something
negative – and yet it forces us to
do the things that we don’t want to do in D.
Moreover, the content in B also is absolutely necessary if we are to
meet the objective that we have already agreed upon for A. Therefore,
given that A, C, and D’ are so important, and yet we still tolerate D – even
though it conflicts with D’ and jeopardizes C – there must be a very powerful
and positive reason for the existence of D that resides in B. What are we
going to put here in B? We need to
ask; why do we comply with D? Why do we tolerate
D? Why are we forced
to accept D? What is the positive need
in B that is powerful enough to explain this? We must ask;
what is the need that is protected by the restricted access? Well, I am
going to put “protect available funds.” Let’s have a
look. Protecting available funds is clearly positive, so let’s see if it
passes all of our checks. Let’s look at
B-D first. In
order to protect available funds it is necessary to
restrict access. Or In
order to protect available funds we must restrict
access. Or in this
particular case (B-D) we might add, In
order to protect available funds we are forced to
restrict access. We don’t want to restrict access but we are
forced to so that we can protect our limited funds. Excellent, this seems to make good sense. What then are
the assumptions that support this logic?
Let’s have a look. In order to protect available funds we are forced to
restrict access because capacity is determined by funding. That seems like a reasonable assumption to
me. We are almost
there, let’s now check A-B. In
order to have good healthcare it is necessary to
protect available funds. Or In
order to have better healthcare we must protect
available funds. That seems
fine and, again, this flushes out the last and nonetheless important
assumption that lies buried under the A-B arrow. Let’s have look at this. We have to protect available funds because funding is limited. Healthcare is not the only benefactor of
public expenditure, there are many other competing areas as well. Now we can
finally address a disquiet that we may have experienced earlier when we said
that if we had full access many, or most, or indeed all of our current
problems would go away. You may have
wanted to say “yes but,” and that “yes but” was addressing the second of our
two jeopardies within the cloud. Let’s have a
look. Protecting funds is jeopardized by full access. This is why the statement that full access
would remove the current problems caused the feeling of disquiet, we probably
all went; “yes but we don’t have the money.” We all want to move to a better future but
we are locked in place by our present. So here we
have a description of the generic cloud for public service healthcare. We are locked into a conflict between restricted access in order to
protect our funds and full access in order to ensure appropriate
treatment. Both protecting our funds
and ensuring appropriate treatment are necessary in order to have better
healthcare. Does that feel
something like your reality? I trust
that it does. Please note,
however, this is not a physician’s cloud.
Nor for that matter is it the patients’ cloud, or the tax-payers’
cloud, or the managers’ cloud, or the Ministers’ cloud. Well actually it is
all of these, but each of these might have a more specific and local “take”
on the matter. The generic cloud must
be capable of addressing, at a more symptomatic level, all of the
constituents; the funders, the patients and the staff. Now, nice as
that may be, it has yielded about half of the information that is buried
within it. You see we are locked into
this conflict, and so strongly locked into this conflict at that, that we
can’t see a way out. We can’t see a
way out because of what we do know of the past and what we don’t know of the
future. Our old “know-how” blocks us
from accessing a new “know-why.” We
are locked in by our own psychology.
We need to break out. Let’s go and
have a look for the additional information that locks us in, and then we will
search for a key to help us break out. We are not so
much stopped by something tangible or physical but rather we are stopped by
ourselves. We stop ourselves with
negative fantasies (2). Negative
fantasies are an incredibly pervasive part of modern organizations and yet we
hardly give recognition to their existence let alone their impact. If we don’t acknowledge them, let alone
understand them, then how on earth can we manage them and overcome them? Let’s start then by acknowledging them. First step,
how do we find these things? Well almost the
same way that we found the assumptions.
We found the assumptions by adding on a “because” to the end of our
logical statements. The assumptions
are presumed to be reasonable statements of the here and now. To access the future, however, we need to use
“otherwise ...” This is the only difference. Let’s try it
out, firstly on the restricted access side. In
order to protect available funds we must have
restricted access otherwise ...? We have to ask
what is the “otherwise,” and my interpretation is as follows; ...
volume will rise & costs will balloon Let’s draw
this in. ”Costs will balloon” is negative, and it is also placed into the
future. We fear that volume will rise
and costs will balloon and we will not be able to protect available funds
anymore. In fact to put it more
succinctly, or maybe more frankly, we simply fear that we will lose control. Lets add this
as well. A negative fantasy has a personal aspect to it, we personally fear
that volume will rise, costs will balloon, and we will lose control. Moreover, the fear that that costs will
balloon if volume rises is founded upon our past experience, our past
reality, we know only too well how easy it is for this to happen. If we look a
little harder another distinction that makes negative fantasies different
from assumptions becomes clear.
Assumptions are about the side of the cloud where the assumption
appears. Negative fantasies are about the other side of the cloud. Our negative fantasy is about the
consequences of full access coming about.
The negative fantasy is the rationale that we can use to continue to
substantiate or rather entrench restricted access. OK, then, what
about the other side of the cloud? Is
there a negative fantasy on that side too? Let’s have a
look. Once again we
need to use our “otherwise” to flush the verbalization out. In
order to ensure appropriate treatment we must have
full access otherwise ...? We have to ask
what is the “otherwise,” and my interpretation of the “because is as follows; ...
acuity will rise & costs will balloon Let’s draw
this in. Oh wow! Do you see that? Once again “costs will balloon” forms the
negative fantasy, although this time it is driven by rising acuity. Again this negative fantasy is about the
other side. We know from past
experience that restricted access only results in some people becoming even
more ill until they have to be seen or they present as an acute patient. The negative fantasy is that this will
become worse and worse. Is there a
similar entity about control? Well I
think that there is, its similar but different. Let’s have a
look. On this side we don’t fear losing control, we fear that we won’t gain
control of the situation. People’s
health will become worse and worse, the acuity will increase and costs will
balloon. Let’s put the
two sides together. Do you see how powerful this situation is? Firstly, there is nothing here that any of
us disagree with. It isn’t really even
a conflict diagram, it is more of an agreement diagram. The vast majority of people are likely to
be on the “upper arm” and they genuinely fear losing control. The consequence is that they are going to
push like hell to make sure that full access is not granted. The people on the “lower arm” genuinely
fear that they won’t gain control of the situation. The consequence is that they are going to
push like hell to make sure that restricted access does not remain in
force. We all agree about this and yet
we end up in opposing camps. Moreover, we
don’t go inventing negative fantasies, they are not figments of our
imagination, they are strongly founded in our past
experience. And our past experience is
that costs in healthcare continue to go up and up, regardless of the
situation. It is a world-wide
phenomenon. But the more important
issue is that we fail to ask is; “does it need to be like this?” The assumption
that costs will rise faster than demand and faster than productivity is an
unchallenged assumption. Moreover, it
is corrupted inductive logic. We are
using the past to foretell the future.
We can’t know the future. It
also runs the risk of becoming circular in its logic. There are many cases where costs increase
because they are expected to increase.
We have even quarantined this one in a special corner and given it a
special name “health inflation” as though it has a special cause that we
should not try too hard to understand.
And that is a cause in itself. Can you think
why costs continue to increase? Think
of the analogy of the chain. We have to challenge its validity. Let’s do so. The “rising
demand” that is said to occur from full access is a pervasive world-view in
healthcare and it “feeds” the “costs will balloon” fantasy. We don’t need it, but it makes the whole
fantasy even worse. Interestingly the
“rising demand” idea seems to come from government treasury level and
permeates down through to hospital management. It is an off-shoot of free-market
philosophy that contends that the cheaper a good or service is, or the more
attainable it is, the more people will avail themselves to it. But wait a
moment, if you have a perfectly good refrigerator, would you go and purchase
another just because they had “never been cheaper?” This is flawed logic – is it not? The demand for refrigerators does not approach
infinity as the cost becomes almost nil.
Most modern economies experience this satisfaction, or maybe it should
be saturation, of particular markets.
Demand is finite, not infinite. The demand is about replacement not
novelty. However,
“demand will rise” becomes the default rationale for not improving
productivity. After all, it is argued,
if we increase productivity more people will avail themselves to the service
and we won’t be any further ahead.
Well, we are missing a couple of important points here. Firstly, note
that I used “productivity” not “production,” so even if we could process more
people with the very same finance, and thus not increase costs, we are
defeated by the response that this only serves to stimulate further demand
and we are no further ahead. It’s a
circular argument and it drives me crazy.
It seems that improving outcomes that are technologically driven –
even if it is something as now basic as antibiotics – are OK. Improving outcomes that are productivity
driven are not OK. Not far from
where I live there is a mission cemetery mostly “populated” in the mid to
late 1800’s. It is a salient reminder
of how fatal the simplest of diseases were in our very recent past –
especially for children. Now the
question simply arises, should we not have used antibiotics because that only
increases the workload in healthcare?
What a perverse suggestion! And
yet today we routinely entertain the notion that we can’t do any better and
if we did we would be “punished” by even greater demand. Where is our sense of challenge? In the words of Robert Pirsig (3); do we
have no gumption left? Secondly, this
fantasy fails to recognize that there is a current pent-up or unmet demand
for many services; so that better access will allow more people to use those
services as needed. But this is
not increased demand, it is current unmet demand. There is a difference. Thirdly, it
fails to recognize that most people do not wish to be hospitalized in the
first place. We don’t produce new
illness just to avail ourselves to better access. If you have a perfectly good heart you will
not avail yourself to a by-pass just because it is possible. That sounds like nuts but it has to be said
because currently it is unsaid. I fail
to understand why this is never pointed out – but then it wouldn’t be
negative fantasy if we were to go around and challenge the assumptions. The negative fantasy has a job to do – to
preserve the status quo. And of course
that only makes things worse. Fourthly, the
fantasy fails to recognize that “a stitch in time saves nine,” both literally
and figuratively. Public healthcare
systems restrict access to non-acute intervention, only to have to accept
more and more acute interventions as a consequence. Many times there is a perverse financial
incentive from central government for this to happen. Increasing the availability of early
intervention will free up existing capacity that is currently swamped by
acute admissions that should have been dealt with at a much earlier and simpler
stage. Negative
fantasies don’t evolve out of the “ether” they have very real foundation in
our past. Can you think why we fear
that demand will rise and costs will balloon?
Again think about the analogy of the chain. So long as
negative fantasies are allowed to remain unchallenged then we will not move
forward. Not challenging them is part
of their function. The effect,
however, is only to make things worse.
Our very real fear of repeating consequences from the past only
ensures that we will repeat them, but even more so. We need to
break the cloud, we need to break the conflict, it is necessary but not
sufficient to just challenge the fantasies, we must put up a credible
alternative in place otherwise things will just “snap” back to where they
were. This is a long
section and you may wish to jump ahead to the next, but it would be
worthwhile coming back later on. Negative
fantasy and inductive fallacy – strange bedfellows? No, not at all. You see, healthcare prides itself on being
“evidence-based,” and this is part of the problem, rather than part of the
solution. Evidence-based findings fall
foul of inductive fallacy. Actually it
is called The Problem of Induction, but if you change the grammar a little
then inductive fallacy falls out and it is a sterling partner to narrative
fallacy (4). And by the way, if we
could remove narrative fallacy – the need to ascribe cause to individual
random events – aka “making up stories” then we could winnow the relevant from
the irrelevant much faster. But then I
am forgetting that Shewhart gave us operating definitions for doing this in
the 1920’s we just haven’t stopped to listen yet. The outcome of failure to listen is called
numerical naivety and its quite debilitating.
The cure, fortunately, is simple, accessible, and not at all painful
(5). Anyway,
turning the grammar and the logic around, inductive fallacy allows us to
assume that we can “figure out the properties of the (infinite) unknown based
upon the (finite) known.” That we can
“know the future, given knowledge of the past.” The whole of our negative fantasy is based
on our very real past and its projection into the future – assuming that the
future must be like the past. It then becomes self-fulfilling because we
don’t do anything new. We are trapped
in a double bind (6). The double bind
is a consequence of our assumptions about reality, what reality is actually
doing is another matter, it would be nice if the two coincided. I can’t yet
fully distinguish between a paradigm and a double bind, but I feel that a
double bind ought to be worse. I can
explain, but let me start with paradigms.
Science, it is argued, proceeds step by step through a series of
paradigms (7). Or maybe that should be
hesitant leap by hesitant leap. I
certainly subscribe to that, I would even go so far as to offer a special
cause for it. But let’s looks at some
simple examples. Not very long
ago, the people of Europe had little doubt about the fact of Noah’s
flood. The evidence was abundantly
clear for everyone to see – in the form of what we would now call glacial
outwash moraine – the rubble left by the ice as it retreated back and up from
the lowest level that glaciers reached at any given latitude during the last
glacial period rather than the highest level of any flood, biblical or
otherwise. The change in thinking
required was paradigmal – and I mean amongst professionals, not the
populace. There is only one or the
other way of thinking about this, there is no middle ground. If you find that odd now, then remember
that Copernicus’ discovery of a heliocentric universe came about from trying
to accommodate nested spheres of the observable planetary orbits within
perfect polyhedral; cube, pentagon, and so forth, as surely divine
inspiration would have planned it. When I started
University, my lecturers – the older of them anyway – had been taught that
the surface of the earth was a static sphere, and yet within their
professional lifetimes the earth’s surface turned out to be anything but
static. Static or non-static, its
either/or, there is no half-way. This
was a paradigmal change. Once, to
believe that the earth’s surface was mobile would have been sheer lunacy,
later to espouse that it was static was equal lunacy. During my own
professional exposure to the science of the earth I watched from the
sidelines as “unifomitarianism” was replaced, or at least modified, by
acceptance of catastrophism and Darwinian evolution was modified by
“punctuated equilibrium” (8). Once to
have believed that mass extinction could be a consequence of extraterrestrial
impact was sheer lunacy. Nowadays to
espouse that it isn’t is equal lunacy. Was this a
paradigmal change? Well sometimes I
like to think that the fellows in this particular branch of the science were
just a little “dull,” after all the new science was just an extension in
scale of the old. But this would be
unfair (as it was intended) because the whole of science got a wake-up
call. In particular Mandelbrot demonstrated
how power-laws underlie so many natural processes – the so-called fractal
nature of things (9). And in fact this
was paradigmal. Out went arteries and
arterioles, veins and venules, and in came ...., um well nothing, you can’t
replace 4 exam questions with “it depends.”
And of course “business” picked up on the concept of deterministic
chaos rather quickly, forgetting all along that it still didn’t know anything
about the concept of noise in the system.
Numerical naivety is still alive and well. And, as has since been pointed out, the
exponents in fractals or power laws, even in deterministic chaos, are almost
impossible to “know” (4). We can
easily make complex fractal “pictures” from arbitrary values of the exponent,
but we can’t easily extract the unknown exponent from a known “picture.” Let’s step out
a moment. Evidence of glacial moraine
existed since the civilization of man – the two are connected in time. Evidence of a non-static earth’s surface
existed way prior to man. Evidence of
extraterrestrial impact didn’t suddenly appear. The evidence was always there, but it can
only be recognized within its paradigm. Modern
so-called “evidence-based” medicine is also always “within” paradigm; the
current paradigm. Want to test
this? Go and write a research grant
application for something “outside” the current paradigm. You will have a snow flakes chance in hell
of success – and we say that we crave innovation – but only if it is within
paradigm – and if someone else has done it first. And every time I do this I am reminded of
Gregory Bateson’s admonishment that knowledge is recursive (10), which I take
to mean nested and circular. New
paradigms break out of the old circularity. Now notice
something here. In all of these
examples, we are “of” the system. We
didn’t evolve separately of the earth, we are a consequence of it (10). We “try” to stand dispassionately to one
side and investigate our surrounds, but nowadays most scientists acknowledge,
if not occasionally celebrate, the social context in which this
“dispassioned” search takes place (how else can we excuse the inevitable
cock-up). But what then of
investigating non-physical things – social things for instance. This raises all the previous issues to a
higher order or to a higher logical type.
We are no longer “of the thing” we are intimately also “in the thing”
as well. And this is where inductive
fallacy runs riot. When we
research “social things” we are both “of it” and “in it,” we are doubly
bound, and usually unaware so. Our logic
is so incredibly recursive, and correctly so, that we can’t break out of the
circularity. Let’s have a
look at a concrete example. Drucker wrote
an article for the Harvard Business review in 1963 entitled “managing for
business effectiveness (11). It was
essentially about power-law distributions (Pareto distributions but he didn’t
use that terminology) as applied to income streams and to cost streams in a
firm. He commented; “'Revenue money' and 'cost money,' to put it dramatically,
are not automatically the same 'money stream.' Revenue produces the wherewithal for the
costs, of course. But unless
management constantly seeks to direct these costs into revenue-producing
activities, they will tend to allocate themselves by drift into 'nothing producing' activities. One major reason why managers do not, as a rule,
understand this fact is their mistaken identification of accounting data and analysis with economic data and business
analysis." Accounting
data and analysis exists within a paradigm that says that all indirect costs
can be apportioned, that is – allocated, across the business in some direct
relationship to “effort.” Economic
data and business analysis – in his opinion – suggested that there was a
power-law proportionally at work. That
a few products and/or a few customers make an disproportionate contribution
to the income of the firm is well understood, but that a few customers might
make a disproportionate call on indirect costs is not so well
recognized. But the key here is the
mistaken “identification” by managers.
That is to say that their accounting paradigm does not allow them to
see the evidence that an economic paradigm would. And note, it was managers not accountants
that he was addressing. He went on
further to say; “I am aware of the work done on these and related
problems of accounting theory and practice – indeed I owe whatever
understanding of accounting that I have to this work and to the accountants
engaged in it. But it will be years
before the results of this work will penetrate accounting practice, let alone
change the way businessmen use or misuse accounting data.” This has been
a well known problem for a long time.
In 1987, twenty three years after Drucker, Johnson and Kaplan
encapsulated the problem in book “Relevance lost: the rise and fall of
management accounting” (12). And still
nothing happened. The evidence was
there, but there was no action. The
cost accounting paradigm is pervasive.
So pervasive in fact that Kaplan went on to write numerous books
“within” paradigm trying to “fix” the observed anomalies (13). Johnson in contrast went outside the
paradigm and embraced Deming’s more systemic approach to business (14). However, it
took someone from outside of the accounting system, Eli Goldratt, to really
break out of the circularity. In 1985,
two years prior to Johnson and Kaplan’s book, Goldratt presented a paper at
the Institute of Management Accountants’ annual convention (15), that paper
was entitled “cost accounting, public enemy number 1 of productivity.” The need arose because operational
decisions were yielding (and always had yielded) profits that far exceeded
those that cost accounting decisions suggested should occur. Accounting professionals were certainly
aware of the problem but they weren’t doing anything to address it. That has since changed with the work of
Corbett, Caspari and Caspari (16, 17), and more recently Ricketts (18) who
has extended the principles into service applications. What did
Goldratt do? He moved the goal posts
into the next town. He recognized that
out-flowing streams of physical product and the concomitant inflowing streams
of revenue did indeed follow power-law relationships, but in addition that the
power law was referenced with respect to just one place – the constraint in
the system, and ultimately with time rather than unit output. Accounting professionals had known that for
more than a century, but Goldratt did something
about it – he codified a new set of accounting assumptions to accommodate
that understanding (19). Moreover, he recognized that indirect costs can not
be allocated to anything. There is no
natural basis for doing so. He removed
the psychological crutch that people had been depending upon for so long. And if that is frightening, it ought not to
be. Indirect costs that can no longer
be “expensed” to everything else come under considerable and real scrutiny
for the very first time. The assumption
that costs must rise with output is broken, they
can no longer allocate themselves by drift
into “nothing producing” activities. Health costs
currently balloon because our accounting and operational assumptions are,
still, frankly, corrupt. Deming had
this to say from an operational perspective (5); “No one gives a hoot about profits –
if they did they would be interested in learning better ways to make them.” If you
nominate a “for-profit” organization, I will show you how, within a few
hours, that they make conscious decisions to produce product that generates
less income than other products that could equally be sold and that would
generate more income. Moreover, such
firms actively promote such inverted priorities. Every single “for-profit” firm that makes
management decisions based upon cost accounting does this. Every single one. Now if that is
the case for “for-profits” and it is testable if you choose to test it, what
then is the case for “not-for-profit” or rather “for-cause” organizations
which use cost accounting for decision analysis? What is the chance that it is any
better? Absolutely zero. What is the chance of being worse? Very, very, high indeed. Health costs balloon, we know that, we just
didn’t know why. Maybe out of
pure theatre, or perhaps more correctly the need to shock people out of their
complacency, Goldratt called cost accounting “public enemy No. 1.” But I think people miss the point, cost
accounting is “of us,” and we are immersed “in it,” it is our invention and
it doesn’t work. We and our psychology
are the real problem. Cost accounting
is merely a symptomatic outcome of our psychology. Operating
large serial dependent variable businesses is something that is so new and so
different from what we have done in the past that we fail to notice that this
new way of operating also needs new ways of thinking. And they are not really new ways of
thinking, they are just new ways of rearranging our old ways of thinking (we
can’t do things that we are not genetically capable of). In the physical sciences where historic
reality is unchanging, it is our current thinking or interpretation that
changes. In contrast in this
particular social arena our current reality has changed while our historic
interpretation of it has remained unchanged.
That is a very substantial difference for sure. Inductive
fallacy seems to require that we do depend upon outsiders to break the
circularity (7, 16). We do need
someone from outside of the current smaller system to show us the rules for
the larger surrounding system. We need
someone from the larger surrounding system to show us our errors of logical
type. The philosophy, or the
epistemology, of this has existed since 1913 – if only we would stop for a
moment to listen. Deming put it thus
in 1994 (20); “The
prevailing style of management must undergo transformation. A system can not understand itself. The transformation requires a view from
outside.” I’ll repeat
again, Donald Berwick’s suggestion, that in order to do this requires an
attitude of respect among strangers. Remember; “paradoxes [and
paradigms] are generally paradoxes [and paradigms] only because they are
based on a logic or rationale that is different from what we understand or
expect (21).” If healthcare is to remain “evidence-based”
then it also is to remain locked into its current paradigm, a victim of its
own inductive fallacy. Remember in 1963 Drucker said it could be
quite a while; 1963, 1973, 1983, 1993, 2003 – how many decades exactly must
we wait? Are we clever or are we not? Well, you
know, we have broken the conflict 3 times already; in each of our specific
“No Delays” approaches to; (1) emergency department, (2) non-acute surgery,
and (3) nursing and discharge. We
broke the conflict by recognizing that healthcare processes are just like the
human body – there is always a rate limiting step. We need to
remember that; Now ask yourself. If we don’t know where the rate limiting step, the weakest link, is in
our system, then our cloud looks like this; In fact this cloud is predicated upon the fact that every link is in viewed as the weakest link. That is certainly how it feels to anyone
trapped within their local performance measures. That is why managers must protect available
funds. With every link behaving as
though it is the weakest link there is no end to the demand for funds and in
the end we must restrict access in order to
cope. That is also
why we fear full access. With every
link behaving as though it is the weakest link there is no hope of rapidly
increasing productivity and therefore we must assume that costs will balloon. What we need
is to allow ourselves time; We need to recognize the existence of just one, not many, rate
limiting steps. After all, if we don’t
know where the rate limiting step is in our system, what is the probability
that new expenditure will go to one of the many non-rate limiting steps that
can not increase productivity? About
100% – right? We know this already, this
is why healthcare seems like a bottomless pit. And if we
don’t know where the rate limiting step is in our system, what is the chance
that productivity improvements will be focused on that one critical step that
will increase productivity? About 0% –
right? Once again we know this
already, this is why healthcare seems like a leviathan. We have to know where the leverage points
are, we have to know how to treat the cause and not the superficial symptoms. It is our way
of thinking in the past that has been wrong.
It is fear of revisiting these outcomes caused by wrong thinking that
locks us in place via our negative fantasies. To break the
cloud we have to introduce something that is missing; Then the following will happen; We introduce new knowledge, new know-why, of the systemic nature of
public service healthcare. The
know-why exists, we have seen the results that can be achieved. If we approach the matter systemically,
then we can rapidly improve output, and move towards full access and we can
do so without endangering funds. In
fact we must do so without endangering funds,
there is no other choice. Well, what if
people miss the point? Moreover, how
would we know that people have indeed missed the point? Fortunately this is quite easy to
detect. There are 4 major sets of D-D’
conflicts that people will put forth if they don’t agree with the solution,
or if the do agree with the solution but feel threatened by it. All of these are built around the negative
fantasy that underlies the B entity.
Like a LEGGO construction you can slide these different major D-D’
conflict sets into the pre-existing A-B-C form. Let’s leave these objections for another page, they are too important to squeeze in here and
deserve a page of their own. You do
need to know how to interpret these objections otherwise you won’t know how
to address them should they arise. Although we
have only looked at the logic of clouds, Goldratt’s Thinking Process is well
embedded in healthcare – I know that simply from the volume of visits the Thinking Process section of this website gets from health providers (commercial and
governmental). Finding published
evidence of this is more difficult.
However, while hunting up information on jeopardies in clouds I
checked back on a presentation by Richard Reid of the University of New
Mexico (22). This describes a
not-for-profit, or rather a for-cause healthcare organization; Planned
Parenting of New Mexico. Richard and
his team applied Goldratt’s Thinking Processes to this organization and
derived a cloud using a process known as the 3 cloud method. The A, B, & C, of the cloud that they
derived are essentially the same as we have arrived at here. A copy of the presentation made to the 2005
conference of the Theory of Constraints International Certification
Organization is attached via the references below. There are comprehensive logic trees, if you
are interested in the detail of this approach then this is a very thorough
and useful piece of work to examine. And just to
demonstrate that the Thinking Processes have, in a relative sense, a long
pedigree in healthcare, Antoine van Gelder showed in 1991 a very concise
analysis of the problems in outpatient clinics at Pretoria Academic Hospital
using some very succinct cause and effect (23). This presentation can also be accessed via
the references below. We need both
sides. We need management to firmly
protect available funds. We need
clinicians to firmly ensure appropriate treatment. But we shouldn’t let fear of the
non-systemic actions of our past stop us from new systemic improvements in
the very near (immediate) future. We
need to use a systemic management approach and we need to include both managers and clinicians in the education so that we
are all talking one language, and one that we understand. In prior pages
we have examined 3 logistical solutions for each of the major sections of
public service hospitalization. Each
of these solutions raises productivity, that is we can do more with existing
resources without people working harder, and my preference would always be
for people to work less hard, and we can do that too, if we think about
it. In fact it becomes a virtuous
cycle. Harking back
to Edward Bear in the introduction, we need to stop banging our heads against
the stairs just long enough to work out that there is another way. The other way is systemic and depends upon
identifying the weakest link in the chain and fully protecting that
link. Often, protecting the weakest
link means not doing what we formerly considered “our best” in the
non-constrained areas. It means much
better collaboration and cooperation across all the multifaceted aspects and
multitasking resources of the non-constraints. The weakest
link is a proxy for the whole system. (1) Rackham, N.,
(1988) SPIN selling. McGraw-Hill Inc.,
197 pp. (2) Harvey, J. B., (1988) The Abilene paradox
and other mediations on management.
Lexington Books, 150 pp. (3) Pirsig, R. M., (1984) Zen and the
art of motorcycle maintenance: an inquiry into values. Bantam Books, pg 367. (4) Taleb, N. N., (2007) The black swan: the impact of the highly
improbable. Random House, pp 40-41. (5) Wheeler, D. J., (2000)
Understanding variation: the key to managing chaos. Second edition, SPC Press, pg 97. (6) Bateson, G., (1972) Steps to an ecology of mind. The University of Chicago Press, 533 pp. (7) Kuhn, T. S., (1996) The structure
of scientific revolutions, 3rd edition.
The University of Chicago Press, 212 pp. (8) Ager, D.,
(1993) The new catastrophism: the importance of the rare even in geological
history. Cambridge University Press,
231 pp. (9) Gleick,
J., (1987) Chaos: making a new science.
Penguin Books, 352 pp. (10) Bateson,
G., (2002) Mind and nature: a necessary unity. Hampton Press, 220 pp. (11) Drucker,
P. F., (2006) Classic Drucker. Harvard
Business School Press, pp 81 – 95. (12) Johnson, H. T., and Kaplan, R. S.,
(1987) Relevance Lost: the rise and fall of management accounting. Harvard
Business School Press, 269 pp. (13) Kaplan, R. S., and Cooper, R., (1998) Cost and
effect: using integrated cost systems to drive profitability and
performance. Harvard School Press,
357 pp. (14) Johnson, H. T., (1992) Relevance regained: from
top-down control to bottom-up empowerment.
Free Press, 228 pp. (15) Caspari,
J. A., and Caspari, P., (2004) Management Dynamics: merging constraints
accounting to drive improvement. John
Wiley & Sons Inc., pg xix. (16) Corbett, T., (1998) Throughput Accounting: TOC’s management accounting system. North River Press, 174 pp. (17) Caspari,
J. A., and Caspari, P., (2004) Management Dynamics: merging constraints
accounting to drive improvement. John
Wiley & Sons Inc., 327 pp. (18) Ricketts, J. A., (2008) Reaching the goal: how
managers improve a services business using Goldratt’s Theory of Constraints. IBM Press, 369 pp. (19) Goldratt,
E. M., (1990) The
haystack syndrome: sifting information out of the data ocean. North River Press, 262 pp. (20)
Deming, W. E., (1994) The new
economics: for industry, government, education. Second edition, MIT Press, pg 92. (21) Harvey, J. B., (1988) The Abilene paradox and
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Lexington Books, pg 20. (22) Reid, R,
A., Black, J., and Coleman, S. A., (2005) Applying the TOC thinking
processes in a healthcare organization: a case study. Theory of Constraints
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Gelder, A., (1991) Outpatient blues. Theory of Constraints upgrade
workshop. This Webpage Copyright © 2008-2009 by Dr K. J.
Youngman |